Feature integration in natural language concepts by Hampton, J. A. et al.
Hampton, J. A., Storms, G., Simmons, C. L. & Heussen, D. (2009). Feature integration in natural 
language concepts. Memory & Cognition, 37(8), 1150 - 1163. doi: 10.3758/MC.37.8.1150 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/MC.37.8.1150>
City Research Online
Original citation: Hampton, J. A., Storms, G., Simmons, C. L. & Heussen, D. (2009). Feature 
integration in natural language concepts. Memory & Cognition, 37(8), 1150 - 1163. doi: 
10.3758/MC.37.8.1150 <http://dx.doi.org/10.3758/MC.37.8.1150>
Permanent City Research Online URL: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/1008/
 
Copyright & reuse
City  University  London has developed City  Research Online  so that  its  users  may access the 
research outputs of City University London's staff. Copyright © and Moral Rights for this paper are 
retained by the individual author(s) and/ or other copyright holders. Users may download and/ or print 
one  copy  of  any  article(s)  in  City  Research  Online  to  facilitate  their  private  study  or  for  non-
commercial research. Users may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any 
profit-making activities or any commercial gain. All material in City Research Online is checked for 
eligibility for copyright before being made available in the live archive. URLs from City Research 
Online may be freely distributed and linked to from other web pages. 
Versions of research
The version in City Research Online may differ from the final published version. Users are advised to 
check the Permanent City Research Online URL above for the status of the paper.
Enquiries
If you have any enquiries about any aspect of City Research Online, or if you wish to make contact  
with the author(s) of this paper, please email the team at publications@city.ac.uk.
Hampton et al., Feature Integration.  Page 1  
 
RUNNING HEAD: Feature integration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Feature Integration in Natural Language Concepts 
 
 
James A. Hampton 
City University, London 
 
Gert Storms 
Catholic University of Leuven 
 
Claire L. Simmons, Daniel Heussen 
City University, London 
 
 
 
 
 
Address for correspondence: 
James A. Hampton 
Psychology Department 
City University 
Northampton Square 
London EC1V OHB, UK 
hampton@city.ac.uk 
Hampton et al., Feature Integration.  Page 2  
Feature Integration in Natural Language Concepts 
Abstract 
Two experiments measured the joint influence of three key sets of semantic features on the 
frequency with which artifacts (Experiment 1), or plants or creatures (Experiment 2) were 
categorized in familiar categories. For artifacts, current function outweighed both originally 
intended function and current appearance. For biological kinds, appearance and behavior, 
an inner biological function, and appearance and behavior of offspring all had similarly 
strong effects on categorization. The data were analyzed to determine whether an 
independent cue model, or an interactive model best accounted for how the effects of the 
three feature sets combined. Feature integration was found to be additive for artifacts but 
interactive for biological kinds. In keeping with this, membership in contrasting artifact 
categories tended to be super-additive indicating overlapping categories, whereas for 
biological kinds it was sub-additive, indicating conceptual gaps between categories. The 
results underline a key domain difference between artifact and biological concepts. 
 
Keywords: Concepts, Feature Integration, Domains, Categorization 
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Feature Integration in Natural Language Concepts 
When an object is identified as being an instance of a conceptual class, what aspects of the 
object are involved in the decision, and how are those aspects combined? This question has 
been central to the field of concepts and categorization. Having rejected the classical notion 
that each concept has defining properties which provide a conjunctive classification rule 
(Smith & Medin, 1981), the prototype model of concepts (Rosch, 1975) held instead that 
concepts of general classes are represented in the mind by clusters of features constituting a 
prototype of the most characteristic or representative example of the class (for more recent 
accounts of prototype theory see Hampton, 1995; 2006). Categorization proceeds by 
determining how many of these features are possessed by any particular instance, or 
subtype, and giving a positive decision in the case that the weighted sum of positive 
features reaches some criterion value. Feature weights are assumed to reflect the 
“correlational structure” of the world, with greater weight given to features that have higher 
statistical association with category membership. 
Critics of the prototype view (Murphy, 2002; Murphy & Medin, 1985; Rips, 1989) 
have rightly pointed out that there is much more to our conceptual knowledge than a simple 
clustering into kinds based on similarity. In particular, research has shown that statistical 
properties alone do not predict the degree to which people weight different features in 
conceptual categorization, especially when there are causal links between the features (Ahn 
& Dennis, 2001; Rehder, 2003; Sloman, Love & Ahn, 1998). Similarity is in any case a 
notoriously underspecified notion, since a similarity metric between objects can only be 
defined once the relevant aspects or features have first been identified, and the basis of 
similarity will thus change with each pair of concepts being considered, raising the specter 
of circularity or computational intractability (Hampton, 2001; Medin, Goldstone & 
Gentner, 1993; Smith & Medin, 1981). As an alternative to a model based on similarity, it 
has been argued that categorization in natural concepts is based primarily on deeper 
“theory-like” representations (Bloom, 1996; 1998; Murphy & Medin, 1985; Rips, 1989). 
For example an object may be a chair because it was the designer’s intention when it was 
made that it would fulfill that particular role (Bloom, 1998; Gelman & Bloom, 2000; 
Jaswal, 2006; Matan & Carey, 2001; Rips, 1989). Or a creature may be a tiger because it 
has some essential property within its cells that causes it to look and behave like one 
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(Gelma, 2003; Medin & Ortony, 1989). While the evidence for deeper causal factors 
affecting categorization is strong, other studies have found that similarity of physical 
appearance is by no means ignored when categorizing either artifacts (Malt & Johnson, 
1992) or biological kinds (Hampton, 1995; Hampton, Estes & S. Simmons, 2007; Hampton 
& Simmons, 2003). Thus if similarity-to-prototype were computed over both appearance 
features and deeper properties such as shared origins or inner structures, the simple notion 
that the probability of a categorization depends on the degree of match between the known 
characteristics of an individual object and a concept representation remains a strong 
theoretical contender. As argued in Hampton (2008), the theory-based and essentialist 
approaches still need an account of why categorization is fundamentally probabilistic and 
vague, and positing degrees of membership based on degree of match to conceptual 
contents is the best way to provide such an account. 
The primary focus of the current research is on the probabilistic nature of 
categorization. Most natural categories are defined along multiple dimensions. A chair has 
a characteristic appearance, is made of certain materials, can be used in particular ways, 
and is created by certain processes. An apple has a visual appearance, taste and texture, 
internal biological processes and causal relations to the apple tree on which it grew, and the 
potential apple trees that may grow from its seeds. The issue to be addressed is how these 
different dimensions are combined in order to arrive at a categorization decision. Suppose 
that a fruit had the appearance of an apple, but was picked from a pear tree – how do people 
resolve this contradictory evidence in deciding whether it is an apple or whether it is a 
pear? Or consider the lighthouse/bell-tower in the small port of Collioure in South-West 
France (see Figure 1). Beginning in mediaeval times as a lighthouse to mark the entrance of 
the port, in the 18th Century with the demise of the port it was turned into a bell-tower for a 
chapel. How do people decide in this case what kind of thing it is? Is it still a lighthouse? Is 
it a bell-tower? When a Tuscan style cupola was added in the 19th Century did this change 
its status further? (See http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collioure). 
Hampton (1995) conducted an investigation of this general question and found that 
people responded in a probabilistic fashion, taking account of all available information. The 
more apple properties that an object has, then the more people were likely to say that it is 
an apple. Our experiments aimed to investigate how this likelihood is determined. Does 
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each feature have a constant additive effect, or does the effect of one feature vary as a 
function of the presence or absence of others?  
The integration of information in the mind is a central issue that has been investigated 
in a wide range of situations, ranging from perceptual judgments (Ernst & Banks, 2002) to 
real-life decision making (Dhami & Harries, 2001). In relation to categorization a number 
of different models of feature integration have been proposed (e.g. Reed, 1972). Rosch 
(1975) suggested that similarity to prototype might be measured by counting the number of 
matching features – in itself a rather imprecise notion. Rosch and Mervis (1975) developed 
a method for calculating a “family resemblance score” as an operationalization of the 
notion of distance from prototype, and this score was shown to predict typicality within a 
category. Hampton (1979) suggested that a weighted sum of category features should be 
used to predict degree of membership, where the degree to which an object matches each 
category feature, multiplied by the feature’s weight for the category concept, is summed 
across the features of the concept. Feature weights are specific to each concept, but are 
constant across potential objects. These proposals are versions of the independent cue 
model for categorization (Reed, 1972) according to which each feature or cue provides a 
constant amount of weight to the decision, independently of the other features. 
An alternative to the independent cue model is the set of models based on Medin & 
Shaffer’s context model (Medin & Shaffer, 1978; Nosofsky, 1988). In their model they 
proposed that degrees of match for each feature should be multiplied together to determine 
similarity. In the case of the context model, similarity was computed to a set of exemplars, 
but the same notion can readily be applied to calculating similarity to a prototype (Smith & 
Minda, 1998).  
In order to determine whether features are being combined additively or non-
additively, a simple test is to look at the influence of a given feature on categorization when 
other features are either present or absent. If the influence is the same, then the independent 
cue model fits the data best. If the influence is stronger in the presence of other features 
than in their absence, then a non-additive model, such as a multiplicative model is needed. 
In a preliminary test of this proposal, Hampton (1995) analyzed the data from four 
experiments in each of which six groups of participants categorized six different versions of 
concept instances. The six versions were constructed by using two sets of features. One set 
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(based on appearance) was present or absent, while the second (based on function or 
biological essence) was either fully present, partially present or absent. When a feature was 
absent, it was replaced by a contrasting feature of a closely related category. Frequencies of 
“yes” responses were analyzed to determine whether the effect on categorization 
probability of changing each feature was independent of, or dependent on, the state of the 
other feature. For example, did changing the appearance of a creature have the same size of 
effect on categorization regardless of whether the essence feature was present, partially 
present, or absent? The results indicated that, contrary to the independent cue model, the 
effects of the two features were not additive. The effect of changing a feature was greater 
when the other feature was fully present than when it was partially or fully absent. 
However the test was not ideal, involving as it did pooling data from 4 experiments, with 
some items repeated between experiments. Nor was it possible to make any differentiation 
between different domains of concept. The goal of the current research was therefore to 
examine this phenomenon in a more systematic and controlled fashion. By using three 
binary features in a 2x2x2 rather than a 2x3 design, a more comprehensive test of feature 
independence was possible. The effect of removing any particular feature could be tested at 
three levels: with both the other features present, with just one other feature present, or with 
neither present.  
We considered concepts in two broad domains: artifacts and biological kinds. There is 
already considerable evidence that these domains differ in many ways in terms of 
conceptual structure. As an early example, Keil (1986) found that transforming the 
appearance of an artifact would change its type, whereas transforming a biological kind 
would not. On the other hand making a discovery about a biological kind could affect its 
categorization, while similar discoveries did not affect artifact categorization. Further work 
by Kalish (1995) and Estes (2004) found that many people tend to consider membership in 
biological kind categories to be an objective fact so that a disagreement could be resolved 
by reference to an expert, whereas membership in artifact categories may be more a matter 
of subjective opinion. There is also interesting evidence of domain specific semantic 
aphasias which has been attributed to different patterns of correlation observed amongst the 
features of biological and artifact kinds (Tyler et al., 2000; Cree & McRae, 2003). Ruts, 
Storms & Hampton (2004) showed similarly that superordinate biological kinds have much 
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tighter similarity clusters than artifact kinds, allowing the similarity space to be easily 
divided into linearly separable conceptual categories. We therefore predicted domain 
differences in how features combine. Biological kinds may be represented with a common-
cause structure (Rehder, 2003) – an underlying genetic cause leads to inner functions and 
outward appearance, and to the appearance of offspring. With a common cause leading to 
three features, the absence of any one of those features may act strongly to reduce 
confidence in the cause still being present. Once this confidence has been reduced, the 
absence of a second feature will be less critical – the biggest drop in confidence occurs with 
the first sign of trouble. In contrast, artifact kinds may have a much looser causal structure. 
The artifact’s appearance is related to its designer’s intentions via a causal path, but we 
predicted that this influence would be much weaker. Because membership in artifact kinds 
is considered to be more a matter of subjective opinion (Estes, 2004; Kalish, 1995), we 
considered that each feature may have an independent effect on categorization, with people 
summing the evidence for an object being of one kind or another in a simple linear additive 
fashion.  
Our first goal was to establish three different aspects of the concepts that would each 
affect categorization, so that their interaction could be tested. For artifacts there is evidence 
from both adult and developmental literature that the function of an artifact is the most 
important feature in determining its class (Bloom, 1998; Margolis & Laurence, 2007; Rips, 
1989). A prototypical chair may broadly be defined as a movable object that is used for 
sitting on. In addition to current function, it has been argued that an even more crucial 
feature is the function or use for which it was intended (Bloom, 1996; 1998; Gelman & 
Bloom, 2000; Jaswal, 2006; Matan & Carey, 2001). Thus the fact that a craftsman 
constructed an object with the intention that it be a chair may over-ride the fact that for 
some reason the object cannot be sat upon, or that it is currently in use as a bed-side table. 
Evidence of the relative importance of current versus historically intended function is 
mixed. For example, Chaigneau, Barsalou & Sloman (2004) gave people different 
scenarios in which various features of an object such as a mop were independently 
manipulated. They found in their studies that a change in current function always had a 
greater effect on naming than did a change in original intended function. In addition to 
function, there is also evidence from Malt and Johnson (1992) that the general appearance 
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of an object can affect its categorization. For example a chair is arguably differentiated 
from a stool more in terms of its appearance (having a back), than in terms of its function 
(enabling the action of leaning back). Malt and Johnson (1992) gave people descriptions of 
artifacts that either had unusual functions together with a normal appearance, or unusual 
appearance together with a normal function. In this study, participants actually placed more 
weight on appearance than on function. They confirmed the category membership of 
objects with normal appearance but unusual functions 58% of the time, but those with 
unusual appearance and normal functions only 25% of the time. This pattern obtained even 
when the story explicitly stated in the former case that the normal function was not served 
by the object.  
For biological kinds, there are similarly three major aspects that may be considered 
crucial to determining type. Prima facie, the first aspect is the appearance of a plant or 
animal. Species may often be differentiated on the basis of their outward physical 
appearance and behavior. In addition it has been shown that people entertain essentialist 
beliefs about biological kinds (Gelman, 2003; Medin & Ortony, 1989). Two kinds of 
feature have been proposed that could figure in such beliefs (Hampton et al., 2007; 
Strevens, 2000). On the one hand, people may believe that the “innards” of the organism 
are crucially important (Gelman & Wellman, 1991). If, for example, some biochemical 
function is present that is characteristically only found within one species, this could be 
taken as strong evidence that the organism has the essence of that species. On the other 
hand people may believe that the genotype constitutes the essence of the organism, so that 
if the organism has offspring resembling a particular kind, that would constitute strong 
evidence of the true nature of the parent, and hence of how the organism should be 
categorized (Rips, 1989). Hampton et al. (2007) obtained evidence using Rips’s (1989) 
transformation task that each of these views may be found in a student population. 
In our experiments, we therefore aimed to construct materials in which three roughly 
equally weighted aspects of an object could be independently manipulated. For biological 
kinds in Experiment 1, they were (1) appearance and behavior of animals or appearance 
and taste/smell of plants (appearance for short), (2) internal biology (innards for short), and 
(3) appearance and behavior of the offspring (offspring for short). For artifacts in 
Experiment 2, these features were (1) appearance, (2) current function, and (3) originally 
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intended function (or original function for short). By forming eight different descriptions of 
objects, plants or animals, corresponding to the presence or absence of each of the three 
features, we were able to measure the relative strength or importance of each type of 
feature as it affects categorization, and then to determine whether they combined in an 
additive or non-additive way.  
It is worth noting that strong versions of psychological essentialism would predict that 
only one of the features of animals and plants should be critical. Although appearance 
features of biological kinds are indicators of essence (since genotype determines 
phenotype), they should be discounted when more is known about the innards or the 
offspring of the organism. People whose essentialist beliefs focus on the internal causal 
homeostasis of biological kinds (Boyd, 1999) should categorize according to what is 
known about the inner biological functions. Others who focus on genetic inheritance of 
essence should categorize on the basis of the appearance and behavior of offspring. 
Similarly a strong version of Bloom’s thesis about artifact kinds would predict that 
originally intended function should outweigh any other features for artifact categorization 
(Bloom, 1998). Alternatively people may feel that the current use of an object determines 
its kind (see Keil, 1986). Finding that appearance affects categorization in both domains 
would therefore provide some additional evidence concerning the validity of these different 
views. 
The experiments presented below were scaled-up versions of two studies presented in 
Hampton and Simmons (2003). To provide some background on the materials and method 
to be used, these earlier studies will be briefly reviewed. Each experiment used 8 pairs of 
biological kinds (4 plants and 4 animals) and 8 pairs of artifacts. Each concept pair 
consisted of two closely contrasting concepts – for example shark and whale, or tie and 
scarf. For each pair of concepts three sets of features were identified as above, each with 
two values – one for the first concept and the other for its contrast. The features were 
combined in all possible combinations to construct 8 possible exemplars, which were given 
to 128 participants to categorize. Participants were given a cover story about a nuclear 
accident on a large remote island (for biological kinds) or a secluded community in a 
remote area of Eastern Europe (for artifacts) and asked to classify each item. The two 
studies differed in whether participants gave a Yes/No judgement to each item with respect 
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to one of the categories, or whether they chose the category in which the item was best 
placed. 
To summarize the results, biological kinds showed strong and significant influences of 
all 3 features on categorization probability. Appearance and behavior of a creature, or 
appearance and smell or taste of a plant were considered important information for 
categorization over and above the biological innards and the offspring information. The 
materials were therefore well suited to the test of cue independence that was planned for 
Experiment 1 below, since a test for the interaction of features will require first that each 
feature has a reasonably strong individual effect on the probability of categorization. For 
artifacts, one feature, current function, dominated the rest, in keeping with Chaigneau et al. 
(2004). The appearance of an object had a very small effect on categorization and in neither 
study did it reach statistical significance. Original function had a minor influence and was 
only statistically significant in the second study. In order to provide materials for a test of 
cue independence, the artifact concepts for Experiment 2 were therefore adapted in an 
attempt to balance up the three types of feature. Current function was weakened by 
suggesting that the objects were now only rarely used – but that when they were employed 
it was solely with a particular function, and original function was boosted by stating that 
the object was both designed for that function and used to serve that function in the past.  
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants. Participants were 375 students at the Catholic University of Leuven, 
Belgium who each completed a booklet for course credit. 
Design and Materials. The biological kinds used in Hampton & Simmons (2003) were 
extended and revised. There were 16 pairs of biological kind concepts, half plants and half 
animals (see Appendix). The pairs were chosen to be sufficiently similar for a hybrid 
possessing some features of each to be reasonably plausible (e.g. a crab versus a lobster). 
For each pair of concepts Appearance, Innards, and Offspring features1 were created. 
Appearance was a set of features that included behavior for the creatures, and either smell 
or taste where appropriate for the plants. Innards referred to a biochemical property found 
in the creature that was specific to only one species. Offspring used the same set of 
appearance features but they were attributed to the offspring of the organism. 
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Thirty-two booklets were constructed, each containing a set of instructions to set the 
scenario and 16 different items to categorize. Half the booklets asked for categorization 
relative to concept A, and half relative to concept B of each pair. Illustrative examples may 
be seen in Appendix A, and the full list of pairs in Appendix B. Within each booklet there 
were 2 items for each of the 8 possible combinations of the 3 features. Items were rotated 
across feature conditions across booklets. Two orders of items in booklets were used. The 
first order had items randomly ordered within blocks for plants and for creatures, and the 
second was the reverse of the first. Materials were prepared in English and translated into 
Flemish Dutch by the second author. Instructions were as follows: 
“Many years ago, there was a nuclear accident near to a large remote island populated 
with a wide variety of animals. The accident resulted in its being contaminated by 
radiation. At some point in the future scientists are sent to investigate the long-term 
effects of this accident. They find and examine a number of individual creatures. Can 
you help them to decide what kind of creature each one is?”2 
Results 
Feature integration.  Booklets were distributed to 384 students, 12 of each of the 32 
different booklets in the design, and 375 of these were returned in usable form. In addition 
to the 9 missing booklets, there were 20 individual missing responses. Overall, missing data 
accounted for less than 3% of the data. Estimates of categorization probability used in the 
analyses were based on between 21 and 24 participants per cell. A further exclusion of data 
was unfortunately required because of a typographic error in the construction of the 
booklets, which meant that one of the 16 concept pairs (tiger-wolf) had to be dropped from 
the analysis. The results reported below are based on the remaining 30 concepts in 15 
concept pairs. 
Mean probabilities of categorization are shown in Table 1 together with standard 
deviation across items. The data for plants and animals were very similar, and so are 
reported together. (Animals had a slightly greater effect of appearance than plants – 
perhaps because behavior for animals is more salient than smell or taste for plants.) 
Probabilities were converted to z-scores for analysis (see Hampton, 1995). This 
transformation assumes that (1) people judge similarity of an item to the category prototype 
based on the descriptions given, (2) they say “Yes” if the similarity passes some threshold, 
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and (3) the distance between the judged similarity of a given item and the threshold has a 
Gaussian distribution across individuals with constant variance. Probabilities of 1 were 
replaced by 23.5/24, and probabilities of 0 were replaced by 0.5/24 for this purpose. Mean 
and standard deviation for z-scores are also shown in Table 1. The three features were 
entered into a 3-way repeated measures ANOVA. All three main effects were significant. 
Mean (and standard deviation) effect sizes (in normal deviates z) for Appearance, Innards 
and Offspring were, respectively, 1.13 (0.28), 0.67 (0.22) and 1.42 (0.26). All main effects 
had F(1,29) greater than 250, all p < .001. All four interactions were also significant, 
(Appearance x Innards, F(1,29) = 4.4, p < .05, Appearance x Offspring, F(1,29) = 73.6, p < 
.001, Innards x Offspring F(1,29) = 22.9, p < .001, and the 3-way interaction, F(1,29) = 
42.1, p < .001). Breakdown analysis of the 3-way interaction showed that the interaction 
between Innards and Offspring features was only significant when Appearance was 
negative. Similarly Appearance interacted with Innards, but only when Offspring was 
negative. All of the interactions took the form of reduced effectiveness of a feature when 
the other was missing.  
The pattern of significant interactions was consistent with a mode of combination of 
features in which a feature has more weight in the presence of other features. The 
independent cue model as adopted by early prototype models (Hampton, 1979; Reed, 1972) 
would predict that features contribute equally to similarity, independently of each other. 
The results suggest a dependence between the features, as would be found in a 
multiplicative model where the degrees of mismatch for each feature are multiplied 
together to determine dissimilarity (Medin & Shaffer, 1978; Smith & Minda, 1998).  
A second analysis directly compared the effect of removing a single feature (measured 
in z transformed probability) when both other features were present, when only one was 
present, or when neither was present. The result is shown in the top panel of Figure 2. For 
all three features, the effect of removing the feature was greater when other features were 
present than when they were absent. There was no difference however between the case 
where just one other feature was present and the case where both were present. The pattern 
was confirmed with a significant effect of feature presence overall (F(1.6, 47) = 49.3, p < 
.001 with Greenhouse-Geisser correction), and for each individual feature (all F > 20.2, p < 
.001). In each case both linear and quadratic contrasts were significant. 
Hampton et al., Feature Integration.  Page 13  
A final check was run on whether the interaction effects could in part be the result of a 
high level of positive responses to the [– – –] stimulus (surprisingly there were 12% yes 
responses to this set of stimuli). Ten of the 30 concepts were selected with the constraint 
that the [+ + +] stimulus had at least 90% yes responses and the [– – –] stimulus had at least 
90% no responses. The resulting data looked very similar, with a mean change in z of 1.43 
when both features were present, 1.25 when just one was present and 0.72 when neither 
was present. The main effect of feature presence was significant (F(2,18) = 14.9, p < .001), 
again with a strong linear trend (F(1,9) = 23.8, p < .001). 
Truth gaps and gluts. Having the same stimuli categorized by half the participants for 
one concept and by the other half for the other (contrasting) concept meant that it was 
possible to determine the degree to which the two probabilities sum to one. If features are 
combined multiplicatively, one should expect a stimulus that has some features of each 
concept to fall into a “conceptual gap” between the two concepts. For example a creature 
that had some squirrel features and some rabbit features may tend to be considered neither 
a squirrel nor a rabbit. To test for this, the observed probabilities of a creature being 
classified in either category were summed for each type of stimulus. Since the [+ – +] 
stimulus for squirrel was the [– + –] stimulus for rabbit (and so forth) the eight stimuli 
could be paired up into four possible conditions. 
The interesting cases were those where a stimulus combined one feature of one concept 
with two features of the other. These creatures or plants were chimerical, having properties 
of more than one type. These cases were broken down into three kinds according to which 
one of the features was pitted against the other two. When either Appearance or Offspring 
was at odds with the other features, the sum of the two alternative categorizations was in 
each case significantly below 1 (M = 0.85, SE = .03, t(29) = 5.1, and M = 0.81, SE = 0.03, 
t(29) = 6.6, respectively, p < .001 in each case). There was a truth “gap”. Creatures or 
plants with inconsistent feature combinations were more likely to be rejected from both 
classes than included in both. (The pattern for plants and animals did not differ 
significantly). 
Surprisingly the final set of cases – those in which Innards were opposed to 
Appearance and Offspring – did not show sub-additivity. The sum of probabilities was 
0.999, (SE = .02) which was clearly not different from 1. When the hidden biological 
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function was at odds with the observable facts about the creature and its offspring, then the 
degree to which the creature was categorized in one category was exactly matched by the 
degree to which it was not categorized in the other. 
Discussion 
 Experiment 1 provided a powerful test of the way in which features are integrated in 
determining categorization for biological kind concepts. Thirty biological concepts were 
tested, with more than 20 participants categorizing each of the 8 stimuli for each concept. 
The results confirmed the significant part played by all 3 features in categorization of 
biological kinds. Appearance, innards and offspring all affected the likelihood of 
categorization. In addition the results confirmed that features of biological kinds are 
combined in an interactive way, consistent, for example, with a multiplicative rule. The 
effect of changing any of the features into that of its contrasting concept was greater when 
other features were present, and was much lower when both others were missing. As a 
result creatures or plants with inconsistent sets of features tended to fall between the two 
categories and were more likely to belong to neither kind than to belong to both.  
Interestingly the drop in effect size with other features was not linear in Figure 2. 
There was little change between Both and One feature present, and then a large drop in 
effect size when both were absent. When both other features are absent, then a feature is on 
its own, and in a minority. While this attracts a certain number of “yes” responses, its 
influence on responding is quite small. When one other feature is present and the other is 
absent however, then the feature in question holds the “deciding vote”, turning the number 
of matching features from a minority to a majority, and hence the feature’s influence is 
much greater. Finally, when both other features are present, the feature in question is the 
first feature to show that the organism is odd in some way. It is here that the large effect 
size indicates that feature integration is non-additive. Even though the two other features 
still hold the majority vote, the effect of losing the first of three features is large, and is 
much greater than the effect of losing the last of three features.  
Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 followed the same design but used artifact concepts. Prior research by 
Hampton and Simmons (2003) failed to find convincing evidence that appearance was 
considered important in categorizing artifacts once original and current function were 
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defined. In order to test the interaction between features it was therefore necessary to adapt 
the materials in order to balance up the features. Appearance was left as it was, but Current 
Function was downplayed by stating that the object was now only rarely used – but that 
when it was used it only had that function. At the same time, Original Function was 
strengthened by stating that the object was not only designed to serve a given function, but 
that it did originally serve that function. Of course if Appearance is truly irrelevant to 
artifact categorization we would not expect it to have an influence on categorization here. 
However given earlier results of Malt and Johnson (1992) there was reason to suppose that 
all three features would affect categorization, enabling additivity to be tested. 
Method 
Participants. Participants were 320 students at the Catholic University of Leuven who 
participated for course credit. No booklets were returned incomplete. 
Design and Materials. The preparation of materials followed exactly the same design 
as in Experiment 1, except that 16 pairs of artifact concepts were used in place of 16 pairs 
of biological kinds, and the three features manipulated were Appearance, Original 
Function, and Current Function. Pairs of similar concepts were chosen so that the features 
could plausibly be swapped between them (see Appendix A for examples, and Appendix B 
for the full list of pairs). Materials were prepared in English and translated into Flemish 
Dutch by the second author. Note that Original Function and Current Function were 
deliberately the same in the case where the two features were both positive (or both 
negative). Most ties were originally made to be worn round the neck and continue to serve 
that function. In order to reduce the dominant strength of Current Function as a feature, the 
current function of the objects was made to sound occasional. For example the putative 
church was “occasionally used for Christian services, and has no other function”, or the 
putative tie was described: “now, when used at all, it is only ever worn with shirts and suits 
by male members of the community as a part of formal dress.” Instructions included a 
scenario to lend some degree of plausibility as follows: 
“Anthropologists visited a secluded community in a remote area of Eastern Europe, 
where they found and studied a number of cultural artifacts. The members of the 
community were very resourceful and had found ways of sometimes adapting things 
to new uses. The anthropologists were puzzled about how each item should be 
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classified. Can you help them to decide what kind of thing each one is?” 
Results 
Feature Integration. Probability of categorization for each stimulus in each of the 32 
concepts was estimated from the frequency of “yes” responses, and results are tabled in 
Table 1, along with corresponding z-score data. Examination of individual pairs of 
concepts revealed an unanticipated effect in the case of the concept pair Theatre/Cinema. In 
Flemish (as in US English) a cinema may also be called a theatre, so that even when the 
object had only cinema features it was still categorized as a theatre by 70% of the 
participants. (In the UK the term “theatre” means primarily a place for live performances of 
plays.) The item THEATRE was therefore excluded from the analysis. The contrasting 
category (CINEMA) could however still be used, since theatres used for live plays are 
never called cinemas in Belgium. 
Frequencies for the remaining 31 concepts were converted to z scores. Since there were 
20 responses per probability estimate, probability values of 0 were taken as 0.5/20, and 
values of 1 as 19.5/20. The z scores were submitted to a 3-way repeated measures ANOVA 
across items with features as factors. All 3 features had strongly significant effects on 
categorization frequency. Main effects (and standard errors) in z score differences and their 
F ratios were: Appearance, z =  0.45 (.07), F(1,30) = 44.2, Original Function, z = .91 (.06), 
F(1,30) = 238.8, and Current Function, z = 1.89 (.07), F(1,30) = 698.1, all p < .001. In 
contrast to the biological kinds in Experiment 1 there was less evidence that the features 
interacted. Original Function did not interact significantly with Current Function (F(1,30) = 
3.56, p = .07) or with Appearance (F < 1), but Current Function and Appearance did 
interact (F(1,30) = 10.6, p < .005). As in earlier experiments, the interaction showed that 
one feature had a greater effect when the other was present than when it was absent. The 3 
way interaction was marginal but not significant (F(1,30) = 3.42, p = .07). 
As in Experiment 1, the effect of removing one feature (i.e. replacing it with that of the 
contrasting concept) was measured when both, just one, or neither of the other features 
were present. The results are displayed in the lower panel of Figure 2. Unlike the biological 
kinds, there was no clear trend for the changing of a feature to have a greater effect when 
the other features were present. Degree of change in z was entered into a 2-way ANOVA 
with feature (3 levels) and presence/absence of the other features (3 levels) as repeated 
Hampton et al., Feature Integration.  Page 17  
measures factors across the 31 concepts. There was no overall main effect of 
presence/absence of other features (F(2,60) = 1.89, p = .16), but there was an interaction of 
this factor with type of feature (F(1.8, 53) = 7.8, p < .005, with Greenhouse-Geisser 
correction for significant lack of sphericity). The interaction can be seen in Figure 2 (lower 
panel). Breakdown analysis of the interaction confirmed that Appearance was the only 
factor that had reduced effectiveness when the other factors were absent (linear trend 
F(1,31) = 5.8, p < .05). Neither of the other two features showed any effect of 
presence/absence of other features when considered alone (linear trend F(1,30) = 2.1, for 
Original Function and F < 1 for Current Function, both p > .15). 
Finally, given the very different pattern of results from Experiments 1 and 2, a direct 
comparison was made between them (the design, language and subject populations were 
the same in each experiment). Since the features did not correspond between domains (with 
the exception of Appearance), the three features were collapsed within each domain and an 
ANOVA was run across the 61 items (30 biological kinds and 31 artifacts), with presence 
of other features as a repeated measures factor with 3 levels (both present, just one present, 
neither present), and Domain (Experiment) as a between items factor with 2 levels, artifacts 
and biological kinds. The effect of interest was the interaction between Feature Presence 
and Domain, and this interaction proved highly significant (F(1.7,102) = 16.6, p < .001, 
with Greenhouse-Geisser correction for sphericity).  
Truth gaps and gluts. In Experiment 1 there was significant sub-additivity when the 
likelihood of an inconsistent stimulus being in one biological kind category was added to 
the likelihood of its being in the contrasting category. A similar analysis was conducted for 
the artifacts in Experiment 2. The observed probabilities of an object being classed in either 
category were summed for each pair of concepts to yield 4 summed probabilities.  
Hybrid cases where a stimulus combined one feature of one concept with two features 
of the other were again broken down according to which one of the features was pitted 
against the other two. When Appearance was at odds with Current and Original Function, 
or when Current Function was at odds with the other two features, then categorization was 
still additive, with summed probabilities of 0.95 (SE = .03) and 0.99 (SE = .03) respectively 
not significantly less than 1 (t(30) = 1.86, p = .07, and t(30) = 0.4, p > .5). However when 
Original Function contradicted Appearance and Current Function, there was a significant 
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tendency for categorization to be super-additive, with a summed probability of 1.09 (SE = 
.03, t(30) = 3.37, p < .005). This result was in stark contrast to the biological kinds, where 
the general trend was for categorization to be sub-additive. 
 Whereas the biological kinds in Experiment 1 had tended towards a truth gap, so that 
items falling between two concepts were likely to be considered not to belong to either, in 
Experiment 2 items lying between two artifact concepts showed no truth gaps. Likelihood 
of being in one category was well predicted by the likelihood of not being in its contrast, 
and where the data deviated from this pattern, items with mixed features were more likely 
to be categorized in both categories than to be placed in neither – a so-called truth glut 
(Bonini et al., 1999). 
Discussion 
The results of Experiment 2 contrasted strongly with those from the first experiment. 
With minor exceptions, the effect of changing one of the features of an object—be it the 
Original Function, the Current Function or the Appearance—was equivalent regardless of 
the other properties of the object. As a consequence there were no truth gaps between 
concepts. Indeed there was some evidence for objects falling into more than one class at the 
same time. As discussed above, there is evidence that artifact categorization is much less 
based on underlying causal schemas than is the case for biological kinds. 
It is also interesting to note that all three types of feature had a role to play in 
categorization. Given the strong advocacy of functions as the basis of defining artifact 
types, it was interesting that an object with the wrong appearance was not as well accepted 
as one with the correct appearance, even when both original and current function were the 
same. Probability of categorization decreased from 95% to 84% when the appearance 
mismatched the category. So at least for some items and some participants appearance was 
enough to over-rule function. Of the 31 items, 22 had reduced categorization probability 
when appearance was the only mismatching feature.  
General Discussion 
The major question driving the research concerned the way in which features are 
integrated when judging category membership. Two possibilities were considered – that 
features contribute independently to the similarity of an instance to a category concept (and 
hence its probability of categorization), and that features interact in their effect. Our results 
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demonstrated very clearly that different systems appear to be in operation for artifact and 
for biological kind categories. For artifact categories, the effect on categorization of 
altering a feature was the same, regardless of whether the other two features were present 
or absent. In line with this result, when an instance lay between two different categories 
(having some features of each), the probability of being in both categories (as measured 
independently) slightly exceeded 1. In contrast, biological kind categories showed an 
interactive pattern of feature integration. The effect of altering a feature was much greater 
when others were present than when both were absent. As a consequence, the likelihood of 
an intermediate instance falling in both of two contrasting categories tended to be less than 
1. 
The different pattern of integration for artifacts and biological kinds is perhaps the 
most important result from this research. Discussion of categorization models in the 
literature has tended to assume that one model for relating feature possession to 
categorization should fit all cases (Nosofsky, 1988; Smith & Minda, 1998). While there has 
been much discussion of important differences between artifact and biological kind 
domains (e.g. Estes, 2004; Gelman, 2003; Kalish, 1995; Keil, 1986) this is the first clear 
demonstration that the way in which information is integrated in the two general domains is 
different. With the benefit of hindsight, it is not difficult to provide some plausible accounts 
of the difference we have observed. Artifact kinds lack an underlying network of causally 
linked properties. In fact Sloman & Malt (2003) have argued that artifact categories are not 
true conceptual categories at all, but correspond more closely to “naming” categories – 
items that for one reason or another have happened to end up with the same name. The 
loose and overlapping landscape of artifact categories lends itself readily to the notion that 
instances that fall between two categories could be considered to be in both, rather than in 
neither.  
On the other hand, our beliefs about biological kinds tend to include the notion that 
there is a strong set of causal principles within each organism that lead to the homogeneity 
of the class as a whole. Boyd (1999) referred to this notion as “causal homeostasis”. At 
least in folk understanding of biological kinds the classes represent tight clusters of similar 
items with large gaps in between. Even relatively close categories like foxes, wolves and 
husky dogs are assumed to form easily distinguishable categories in terms of their 
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appearance, and it is assumed that underlying the similarity of appearance is some deeper 
causal story involving innards and germ lines. In this domain, it makes sense that some 
individual creature which had the appearance of one type of animal, but the innards of 
another should be considered to belong to neither category, rather than to both. The 
interactive pattern of feature integration found for biological kinds reflects the integrated 
nature of the features. The first feature to be altered (be it appearance, innards or offspring) 
immediately casts doubt on whether the organism has the full set of interlocking features 
that characterize a “proper” member of the kind. The effect of an altered feature is therefore 
greatest when the others are present.  
In order to conduct the test of additivity it was first necessary to find different sets of 
semantic features that determine the likelihood of an instance being placed in a class. Some 
comment is worthwhile on the relative weights observed. For artifacts current function or 
use was clearly the strongest influence, but there was still an effect of the other two types of 
feature. Direct comparison is of course difficult, given that the features may differ in 
diagnosticity and centrality (Sloman, Love & Ahn, 1998). In addition the appearance 
features referred to the whole set of perceptual properties of an object (visual, dynamic, 
taste and smell), whereas the inner biological function was a much more specific single 
feature. The finding that original function is not the only factor affecting artifact 
categorization may at first glance appear to contradict the position advocated by theorists 
such as Bloom (1996; 1998) who have argued that the kind of an artifact is determined 
exclusively by its creator’s intention. If a designer had it in mind to create a chair, it should 
not matter what the object looks like, or whether it can be sat upon, it is still a chair. In 
contrast we found that the original intended function of our artifacts played a relatively 
minor role in determining categorization. A way to resolve the issue would be to amend 
Bloom’s thesis. In our covering story we explained how objects had become adapted to 
new purposes, and it would therefore seem plausible that the kind of an object is not 
determined by its first designer, but by its most recent designer. When the people in our 
story took a church and started to use if for art exhibits, (so that it no longer was used as a 
church) they were thereby “re-baptizing” the object as a new kind. This interpretation 
would also fit with Keil’s study of transformations of artifacts (Keil, 1986). When children 
were told of how a metal coffee pot was reshaped and hammered so it looked like and 
Hampton et al., Feature Integration.  Page 21  
could be used as a bird feeder, they were happy to allow that it was no longer a coffee pot. 
The majority of our participants would appear to agree. Nonetheless, even when 
categorizing by current function, the appearance of the object continued to have an effect. 
For biological kinds, a common view is that categorization is driven by some notion of 
“essence” (Gelman, 2003; Murphy, 2002). Hampton et al. (2007) argued that there are two 
discrete notions of essence. One relates to the causal processes at work deep within an 
organism that lead to its appearance and behavior, and the other relates to the notion of a 
germ-line that is passed from parent to offspring. In our scenarios, each of these two types 
of information was available to indicate whether the essence was that of the category in 
question. The data were very clear in indicating that not only both of these more essentialist 
criteria, but also the appearance and behavior of the organism itself were all treated as 
relevant sources of information for categorization. There was no clear “winner” in terms of 
“innards” essentialism versus “germ-line” essentialism or for that matter outward 
appearance features. 
Conclusion 
The results presented here constitute the first demonstration of a key difference 
between biological and artifact kinds. For biological kinds the evidence for kind-ship is 
integrated in a non-additive fashion, with the result that a chimeric creature with aspects of 
more than one species is more likely to be classified in neither than in both. For artifact 
kinds, features are apparently combined in an additive fashion, and items with hybrid 
features may be more likely to be in both categories than in neither. Returning to the 
problem of the lighthouse-bell tower in Collioure, a Google search on 28/8/8 gave 17,800 
hits for “Collioure phare” (lighthouse) and 21,900 hits for “Collioure clocher” (bell-tower). 
Current function has it by a short whisker.  
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Appendix A: Sample of materials used in Experiment 1 (Biological kinds) and 2 (Artifacts) 
Biological kinds 
Concept A Concept B Feature-type Concept A Feature Concept B Feature 
Crab Lobster Appearance A creature with legs and claws that looks and acts just 
like a crab 
A creature with a long tail and claws that looks and acts 
just like a lobster 
  Innards The scientists found that the structure of its eyes was 
identical to that typically found only in crabs 
The scientists found that the structure of its eyes was 
identical to that typically found only in lobsters 
  Offspring They found that the creature had offspring that looked 
and acted just like crabs 
They found that the creature had offspring that looked and 
acted just like lobsters 
Mosquito Wasp Appearance A small flying insect with transparent wings that bites 
people, and looks and acts just like a mosquito 
A striped flying insect that stings people, and looks and acts 
just like a wasp 
  Innards The scientists found that the chemistry of its blood was 
just like that normally only found in mosquitoes 
The scientists found that the chemistry of its blood was just 
like that normally only found in lobsters 
  Offspring They found that the eggs laid by the creature 
developed into offspring that looked and acted just like 
mosquitoes 
They found that the eggs laid by the creature developed 
into offspring that looked and acted just like wasps 
Oak Pine Appearance A tall tree that loses its leaves in winter and that looks 
just like an oak 
A tall tree that keeps its needles all year round and that 
looks just like a pine 
  Innards The scientists found that the micro-structure of the 
wood fibers was just like that only typically found in 
oaks 
The scientists found that the micro-structure of the wood 
fibers was just like that only typically found in pines 
  Offspring They found that when the tree reproduced, new trees 
grew that looked just like oaks 
They found that when the tree reproduced, new trees grew 
that looked just like pines 
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Concept A Concept B Feature-type Concept A Feature Concept B Feature 
Grape Cherry Appearance A small round green fruit which looks and tastes just 
like a grape 
A small, dark red fruit, which looks and tastes just like a 
cherry. 
  Innards The scientists found that its cellular potassium 
metabolism is just like that which is normally only 
observed in grapes.  
The scientists found that its cellular potassium metabolism 
is just like that which is normally only observed in cherries. 
  Offspring They found that when the seeds of this fruit are 
planted, a vine grows, yielding fruit which look and 
taste just like grapes. 
They found that when the seeds of this fruit are planted, a 
tree grows, yielding fruit which look and taste just like 
cherries. 
 
Artifacts 
Concept A Concept B Feature-type Concept A Feature Concept B Feature 
Church Art Gallery Appearance A large building with stained glass windows, and a 
steeple with a cross on the top, which looks just like a 
church. 
A large gothic building with white interior walls on which 
paintings are hung, and which looks just like an art gallery. 
  Original 
Function 
It was originally built just to be a place of Christian 
worship, and had that function in the past. 
It was originally built just to be an exhibition hall for 
displaying large works of art, and had that function in the 
past. 
  Current 
Function 
It is presently occasionally used for Christian services, 
and has no other function. 
It is presently occasionally used for the public exhibition of 
painting and sculpture, and has no other function. 
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Concept A Concept B Feature Concept A Concept B 
Bank-notes Postage 
stamps 
Appearance Rectangular pieces of paper with a colored design and 
an embedded metallic strip which look just like bank 
notes. 
Small rectangular pieces of paper with serrated edges and 
sticky backs which look just like postage stamps. 
  Original 
Function 
Originally, these were produced as a kind of money, 
and they served that function in the past. 
Originally, these were produced for sticking on letters as 
postage, and they served that function in the past. 
  Current 
Function 
They are now just sometimes used for buying or 
selling things, and have no other use. 
They are now just sometimes stuck to envelopes to pay for 
postage, and have no other use. 
Taxi Ambulance Appearance A motor vehicle which is black with a yellow light on 
the top, has a diesel engine and looks just like a 
London taxi. 
A motor vehicle which is white and green with a flashing blue 
light on the top, and which looks just like an ambulance. 
  Original 
Function 
It was originally intended and used to provide transport 
for small groups of people to their desired destination. 
It was originally intended and used to carry sick or injured 
people to hospital for urgent medical attention. 
  Current 
Function 
Now, when it is used, its only use is to take people 
wherever they want to go in exchange for money. 
Now, when it is used, people use it only in the case of 
medical emergencies when the driver takes people to the 
hospital 
Tie Scarf Appearance An item sewn from a long piece of patterned silk fabric 
which looks just like a man’s tie. 
An item which is made of a long thin piece of knitted wool, 
and looks just like a scarf. 
  Original 
Function 
Originally, it was intended to be tied around the collar 
of a shirt as a form of decoration, and in the past it had 
this function. 
Originally, it was intended to be wrapped around the neck for 
protection against the cold when outside, and in the past it had 
this function. 
  Current 
Function 
Now, when used at all, it is only ever worn with shirts 
and suits by male members of the community as a part 
of formal dress. 
Now, when used at all, it is only ever worn round the neck by 
members of the community for keeping warm when outdoors 
in winter. 
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Appendix B: Full set of Concept pairs used in Experiments 
 
Biological Kinds (Expt 1)  Artifacts (Expt 2) 
Concept A Concept B  Concept A Concept B 
Crab Lobster  Church Gallery 
Mosquito Wasp  Banknote Stamp 
Pigeon Crow  TV Monitor 
Lizard Snake  Cinema Theatre 
Tiger Wolf  Ferryboat Warship 
Shark Dolphin  Taxi Ambulance 
Rabbit Squirrel  Tie Scarf 
Horse Cow  Vase Carafe 
Rose Dandelion  Saucepan Helmet 
Mint Onion  Beer glass Jar 
Oak Pine  Sketchbook Diary 
Grass Moss  Roof tile Drain cover 
Grape Cherry  Drum Waste basket 
Apple Orange  Nightshirt Dress 
Pumpkin Watermelon  Rug Blanket 
Carrot Potato  Chimneypot Flowerpot 
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Footnotes 
1. We refer to the three aspects as “features” for simplicity of exposition, although in 
fact each aspect may be composed of multiple features. Since the aim was to 
contrast appearance with deep properties, appearance features were taken together 
as a single set. 
2. Although through an oversight the instructions did not mention plants, in fact half 
the biological kinds included were plants. No participant mentioned that they 
noticed this omission, and as there was no important difference between responses 
to plants and to animals, it was assumed that they took the instructions to apply 
equally to all the items in this section of the booklet. 
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Table 1 
Mean (and SD across Items) for Probability of Categorization and z-scores for each of the 8 Types of Exemplar in each Experiment. 
Experiment 1: Biological kinds (N =30) 
 Offspring appearance + Offspring appearance – 
 Innards + Innards – Innards + Innards – 
 Appearance + Appearance – Appearance + Appearance – Appearance + Appearance – Appearance + Appearance – 
Probability .96 (.04) .63 (.14) .84 (.09) .30 (.11) .51 (.13) .16 (.07) .22 (.09) .12 (.08) 
z-score 1.77 (.30) 0.35 (.38) 1.06 (.39) -0.56 (.38) 0.03 (.33) -1.04 (.31) -0.83 (.36) -1.24 (.44) 
 
Experiment 2: Artifacts (N =31) 
 Current Function + Current Function – 
 Original Function + Original Function – Original Function + Original Function – 
 Appearance + Appearance – Appearance + Appearance – Appearance + Appearance – Appearance + Appearance – 
Probability .95 (.07) .84 (.13) .79 (.12) .59 (.18) .41 (.14) .30 (.17) .11 (.09) .07 (.08) 
z-score 1.65 (.40) 1.11 (.53) 0.92 (.51) 0.24 (.55) -0.21 (.41) -0.59 (.59) -1.27 (.54) -1.46 (.55) 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. The light-house bell-tower in Collioure, South-West France. 
Figure 2. Effect of changing each feature in Experiment 1 (Biological kinds) and 
Experiment 2 (Artifacts) on the z transformed probability of categorization when both, just 
one or neither of the other two features are present. 
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Figure 1 
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Figure 2 
Experiment 1: Biological Kinds
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Experiment 2: Artifacts
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Note: Figure shows the change in categorization probability (z-transformed) resulting from 
a change in the named Feature-type when either Both, just One or None of the other 
features are present. 
